BLMIS<\/strong>\u201d), the company through which Bernard Madoff perpetrated his infamous Ponzi scheme.<\/p>\nBLMIS\u2019s \u2018holy grail\u2019 of equity returns with bond-like volatility came with strings attached: Madoff insisted upon BLMIS performing the triple functions of investment manager, broker, and de facto <\/em>custodian to its clients. Many institutional investors were willing to accept this concentration of responsibilities (and therefore risk) in exchange for the stellar returns that Madoff was apparently able to generate consistently for decades.<\/p>\nIn 2003, Primeo began investing some of its funds with BLMIS indirectly, through two other Madoff feeder funds: Alpha Prime Fund Ltd (\u201cAlpha<\/strong>\u201d) and Herald Fund SPC (\u201cHerald<\/strong>\u201d). Following an in specie <\/em>transfer on 1 May 2007, all of Primeo\u2019s investments with BLMIS were indirect, through Primeo\u2019s shareholding in Herald and Alpha.<\/p>\nPrimeo appointed BBCL and HSSL as its administrator and custodian respectively (together, the \u201cDefendants\u201d<\/strong>) at a time when both of those entities were part of the Bank of Bermuda group of companies, which was subsequently acquired by HSBC in 2004.<\/p>\nUpon Madoff\u2019s arrest, Primeo entered liquidation but it was not until 2013 that the liquidators of Primeo sued the Defendants for the alleged losses suffered by Primeo as a result of the fraud.<\/p>\n
Claims and defences<\/strong><\/h2>\nAs against the custodian, Primeo alleged that HSSL breached its contractual duties concerning the appointment and supervision of BLMIS as its sub-custodian. As against the administrator, Primeo alleged that BBCL breached its obligations in connection with the maintenance of books and records for Primeo, and in determining the net asset value (\u201cNAV<\/strong>\u201d) per share at the end of each month. In his judgment, Mr Justice Jones QC observed that \u201cat the core of the administration claim is a dispute about the role of independent fund administrators\u201d<\/em>. Primeo alleged that, had the Defendants complied with their obligations, Primeo would have withdrawn its investments with BLMIS prior to the fraud being uncovered and reinvested elsewhere.<\/p>\nThe Defendants denied they had breached their contractual obligations to Primeo. The Defendants contended further that Primeo was well aware of the risks associated with BLMIS and that it would have continued to invest with BLMIS in any event. The Defendants argued that Primeo was in any case not the proper claimant for the loss because Primeo\u2019s losses were merely reflective of the losses suffered by Herald and Alpha, in which Primeo was a shareholder at the time of Madoff\u2019s arrest. The Defendants also argued that Primeo\u2019s claim was time-barred insofar as it sought to recover losses arising from a cause of action which accrued prior to 20 February 2007 (i.e.<\/em> six years prior to the issue of the writ by Primeo against the Defendants). If Primeo succeeded in making out its claim for damages, the Defendants argued that a very substantial reduction would have to be made to reflect the contributory negligence on the part of Primeo.<\/p>\nDecision<\/strong><\/h2>\nAfter hearing evidence from more than 25 factual and expert witnesses including three of Primeo\u2019s former directors and a number of experts in the fields of custody and fund administration, Mr Justice Jones QC dismissed Primeo\u2019s claim in its entirety, on the following grounds:<\/p>\n
\n- Causation: <\/strong>Primeo failed to prove that any breach of duty by the Defendants had caused its losses. In other words, even if the Defendants had acted as Primeo alleged they should have, the Court was not persuaded that the directors of Primeo would have decided to withdraw the investments placed with BLMIS and would have ceased to invest further with BLMIS. Although the custodian was also found to be strictly liable for any wilful default of BLMIS in its capacity as sub-custodian, there was no loss for which the Defendants could be held strictly liable. Primeo\u2019s loss did not flow from any wilful default of BLMIS qua<\/em> sub-custodian. Following the in specie <\/em>transfer on 1 May 2007, BLMIS was no longer sub-custodian to Primeo; Primeo held only shares in Herald and Alpha, and they were in the custody of the custodian, HSSL.<\/li>\n
- Reflective Loss: <\/strong>The rule against reflective loss operated to bar the recovery of any of Primeo\u2019s alleged loss, because Primeo was seeking to recover losses suffered by way of a diminution in the value of its shareholdings in Herald and Alpha. As a matter of law, Herald and Alpha were the proper claimants in respect of those losses, and any recoveries obtained by Herald and Alpha would flow to Primeo as a shareholder. In arriving at this conclusion, the Court determined that the appropriate standard against which to assess the merits of the claims by Herald and Alpha against HSSL was that such claims have \u2018a real prospect of success\u2019 (as opposed to being \u2018likely to succeed\u2019 as contended by Primeo).<\/li>\n
- Limitation: <\/strong>Causes of action accruing prior to 23 February 2007 are time-barred under the Limitation Law. This covered almost all claims arising from breaches that occurred while Primeo invested directly<\/em> with BLMIS, as opposed to indirectly through Alpha and Herald.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n
In any case, the Judge determined that he would have reduced any damages awarded against the administrator by 75% on account of Primeo\u2019s contributory negligence.<\/p>\n
Although Primeo\u2019s claim failed on several bases, the Judge\u2019s findings and observations concerning the roles and responsibilities of administrators and custodians will be of significant interest to the funds industry in the Cayman Islands and abroad.<\/p>\n
Custodian: Breach of Duty<\/strong><\/h2>\nThe Judge found that during the years 1993 to 2002, the custodian was not responsible for investments placed by Primeo with BLMIS. Rather, BLMIS was the legal as well as de facto<\/em> custodian of Primeo\u2019s assets placed with BLMIS for investment.<\/p>\nHowever, in August 2002, the custodian entered into a Sub-Custody Agreement with BLMIS (the \u201c2002 Sub-Custody Agreement\u201d<\/strong>), which was governed by Luxembourg law. The validity, purpose, scope and effect of the 2002 Sub-Custody Agreement were vigorously contested.<\/p>\nThe Judge found that the 2002 Sub-Custody Agreement was effective to appoint BLMIS as the sub-custodian in respect of Primeo\u2019s assets held at BLMIS, because it amounted to an \u201cimplied tri-partite agreement<\/em>\u201d between HSSL, BLMIS and Primeo to do so.<\/p>\nIt followed, according to the Judge, that from August 2002 the custodian had contractual duties to use due skill and care in the appointment of any sub-custodian, to assess the ongoing suitability of the sub-custodian, and to ensure that the most effective safeguards were in place in relation to the sub-custodian to ensure the protection of Primeo\u2019s assets. The Judge found that the custodian was in breach of these duties.<\/p>\n
The key issues were whether a reasonably competent global custodian would have made, and then continued, the appointment of BLMIS without requiring (or at least recommending) that BLMIS:<\/p>\n
\n- establish a separate<\/u> securities account with the central securities depository in New York, the Depositary Trust Company (\u201cDTC\u201d<\/strong>), for Primeo\u2019s benefit rather than accepting that Primeo\u2019s securities would (purportedly, because they never in fact existed) be held in BLMIS\u2019s single omnibus client account at DTC and\/or make use of a DTC reporting system known as the Institutional Delivery System (the \u201cID System\u201d<\/strong>); and<\/li>\n
- establish a separate account with the Bank of New York (\u201cBNY\u201d<\/strong>) for treasury bills that BLMIS claimed to hold for Primeo (which also never in fact existed).<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n
In each case, Primeo argued that a reasonably competent custodian would have required or recommended those options, that, if they had done so, Primeo\u2019s directors would then have asked BLMIS to set up such separate accounts for Primeo, and that if BLMIS had refused to do so Primeo would have withdrawn its funds from BLMIS and stopped making further investments. The Judge accepted that a reasonably competent custodian would have made such recommendations, though (as discussed above) he rejected Primeo\u2019s causation arguments.<\/p>\n
Separate Account at DTC or ID System<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nBLMIS purportedly executed large scale bulk trades for all of its investment clients on an omnibus basis, and then separate agency trades for each client\u2019s part of the bulk (i.e. <\/em>the assets were purportedly segregated by BLMIS in its books and records, rather than at the DTC). A separate account at the DTC in the name of BLMIS, but designated for either Primeo or all of the custodian\u2019s clients, would have meant that the agency trade made between BLMIS (as broker) and Primeo (acting by BLMIS as investment manager) would have been settled into the separate DTC account, with the result that the DTC would have issued a settlement notification in respect of this trade, which the custodian could have required to be sent directly either by SWIFT message or through the ID System.<\/p>\nAlternatively, the ID System, without a separate DTC account, would have allowed the custodian to obtain trade confirmations and settlement notifications directly from the DTC. The Judge found that the custodian could have been set up to receive a notification directly from the DTC as an \u2018interested party\u2019 whenever BLMIS identified part of a bulk trade as being allocated to Primeo.<\/p>\n
In either case, he held, there would have been independent confirmation of an actual trade taking place and settlement into BLMIS\u2019s account, as well as the possibility of reconciling confirmations and statements received from BLMIS with those received from DTC.<\/p>\n
Separate Account at BNY<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nBLMIS\u2019s purported strategy involved investing in US treasury bills for a large part of the time, including at month-end as a means by which to protect the confidentiality of BLMIS\u2019s purported trading strategy, and timing the trading of US equities. The treasury bills were purportedly held in BLMIS\u2019s omnibus account with BNY. The Judge found that BLMIS could have established a separate account in its own name designated for each of Primeo and the custodian\u2019s other clients. BLMIS could then have instructed BNY to issue monthly statements directly to the custodian and confirm year-end balances directly to Primeo\u2019s auditors, Ernst & Young. The Judge found that there was no regulatory or practical impediment to doing so, and it would not have interfered with BLMIS\u2019s \u2018triple function\u2019 business model \u2013 nor necessarily prevented Madoff from defrauding the custodian\u2019s clients. However, it would have allowed the custodian to confirm the requisite value of treasury bills at each month end, making it more difficult for Madoff to perpetuate his Ponzi scheme.<\/p>\n
Findings<\/em><\/strong><\/p>\nThe custodian argued, among other things, that these might have been possible options but they did not constitute normal commercial practice, so they could not have been required<\/em> of a reasonably competent custodian, and that any failure to make such recommendations did not amount to negligence.<\/p>\nThe Judge found that, although it was not (and is still not) normal commercial practice for custodians to segregate assets by establishing separate accounts at the DTC and at BNY for their hedge fund clients, in the particular circumstances arising out of BLMIS\u2019s business model, a reasonably competent custodian would have done so. BLMIS\u2019s performance of roles as broker, dealer, and de facto <\/em>custodian introduced operational risks which were not addressed by the normal, commercially acceptable procedures. The Judge found that \u201cwhen the normal procedure is known to be ineffective, failing to apply a readily available alternative is negligent<\/em>\u201d.<\/p>\nIn addition to liability for its own acts and omissions, the Judge also found that, under the Custodian Agreement, the custodian was strictly liable for any wilful default of BLMIS acting as sub-custodian. But from May 2007, BLMIS was no longer Primeo\u2019s sub-custodian. Primeo held only shares in Herald and Alpha, and they were held by the custodian. Accordingly, no loss flowed from any wilful default by BLMIS qua <\/em>sub-custodian \u2013 and so there was no loss for which the custodian could be held to be strictly liable.<\/p>\n